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The Internationalization of
the Beer Brewing Industry
I. HE BEER BREWING INDUSTRY has been
undergoing a process of internationalization for
the past 25 years. This article examines the roles
that three types of international transactions —
merchandise trade, licensing agreements and
foreign direct investment — have played in this
internationalization. As in other industries, a
few general economic factors explain much of
the increase in international brewing activity.
What makes beer brewing a particularly inter-
esting case study is that it provides an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate how certain economic
factors, such as economies of scale and trade





As with most other goods, world merchandise
trade in beer has expanded rapidly over the
past 25 years (see figure 1). Much of the in-
crease in world beer trade — and in world
trade in general — can be attributed to such
factors as lower trade barriers, more efficient
communication and transportation technology,
and growth in real personal incomes. The value
of world beer trade increased from $149 million
in 1965 to $2.08 billion in 1987, a 14-fold in-
crease; at the same time, world trade in all
‘TheFAQ Trade Yearbook indicates that Mexico was the
world’s third-largest exporter of beer in 1987.
goods increased to more than 12.5 times its
1965 value. In more recent years, between 1980
and 1987, world trade in beer expanded 83.8
percent, while total world trade grew only 23.4
percent. Despite its rapid growth, trade in beer
in 1987 accounted for less than one-tenth of
one percent of total world merchandise trade.
On a volume basis, world trade in beer has
nearly tripled since 1965, growing at an average
annual rate of 6.5 percent between 1965 and
1987. The largest exporters of beer in this
growing market, ranked by volume, are the
Netherlands, West Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Belgium and Canada (see table 1).’ The largest
importers are the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Italy and West Germany.
Beer imports as a percent of total consumption
(IPC) and exports as a percent of production
(EPP) are larger for some of the smaller exporters
and importers than they are for some of the
larger exporting and importing countries. As
table 1 shows, among 25 importers, beer IPC
ranges from a low of 0.2 percent in Norway to
16.4 percent in Italy. The percent of beer con-
sumption accounted for by imports in the largest
beer importing country, the United States, is
about 5 percent.
Similarly, among exporters, figures for EPP







41.6 percent in Ireland. The export numbers as
a percent of production for such countries as
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, however, are
questionable as these countries do a significant
amount of re-exporting to other countries (that
is, much of the beer reported as exports may
simply be imported and then re-exported for
consumption elsewhere).2
Few of the countries listed in table 1 are
strictly importers or exporters of beer. Most of
the countries that export beer also import some
beer and vice-versa. This pattern of trade is
known as intra.industry trade. An examination
of the IPC and EPP statistics in table I show
20t1 (1988) notes that the Netherlands has a long history of
re-exporting imported goods.
3Ott (1988) notes that re-exported goods from the
Netherlands are not included in the country’s import
figures.
that intra-industry trade in beer is more impor-
tant to some countries than others. The largest
exporter of beer, the Netherlands, imported on-
ly 4.3 percent of the beer it consumed in 1987.~
Similarly, the two largest importers of beer, the
United States and the United Kingdom, exported
only 0.4 percent and 1.9 percent of their beer
production in 1987. Ireland, on the other hand,
exported nearly 42 percent of its production,
while importing more than 12 percent of its
beer consumption.
The degree of intra-industry trade for a coun-
try can be measured using a simple index, cal-
culated for a given product as the absolute value
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SOURCES: FAQ Trade Yearbook and International Financial Statistics Yearbook.
Ctable I
Selected 1987 Brewing Industry Statistics
Average Annual ~rowthRate, 1915 to 1987
xports lntpotts Inks Industry xports imports Per Imports
Exports Imports A Percent at As Percent at trade Index As Percent of As Percent of Capita Per
1000 HL 1000 IlL Production Consumption 1915 1901 Production Consumption Consumption Capita
Australia 7283 70.0 39% 04% 83 82 150% 17.0% —1.7% 147%
Austna 3610 2850 40 3~2 33 12 1.4 —0.1 10 0,2
Belgium 2537.0 5655 181 47 23 .64 24 53 0.5 57
Canada 24158 448.0 lOS 21 63 .69 138 520 0.4 50,7
Czechoslovakia 2898.0 0.0 12 I 00 1 00 1 00 59 0.0 0.7 0.0
Denmark 19340 208 28 03 .95 .98 03 0.2
W Germany 5706.0 13016 62 16 54 63 82 83 0.2 8.1
Finland 228 139 01 04 .60 24 537 1711 19 1846
France 8720 24459 34 113 56 57 2.4 24 11 13
S Germany N/A N/A N/A N/A .26 N/A N/A N/A 1.6 N/A
Hungary 00 12900 0.0 126 N/A 100 00 286 2,5 —083
Ireland 20860 4150 41.8 12$ 98 .67 21 39.0 20 35.9
Italy 731 2162.8 0,7 164 .85 .93 205 5.7 69 12.9
Japan 29~3 224.0 05 04 13 13 IS 196 20 22.6
Luxembourg 2703 422 409 96 79 73 07 05 08 0.3
Netherlands 5725 2 349 32.6 4 3 89 83 6.2 2.4 08 28
Newzealand 832 705 20 11 88 08 72 367 0,1 33.9
Norway 19,2 4050 09 02 89 .62 —12.2 226 11 26.6
Poland 3271 106.2 28 09 14 .51 123 1.5 107
Portugal 74.5 34.3 1 5 07 97 .37 10 9 N/A 3.7 N/A
Spain 121.0 7350 08 28 58 .72 14,5 19.3 2.7 2 4
Sweden 449 3444 11 19 .91 71 720 84 —i.2 7.0
Switzerland 36.7 485.9 0.9 105 75 86 28 6.4 03 8 1
USSR N/A 9000 N/A 11 N/A NIA 00 88 14 70
United Kingdom 11400 40931 19 65 54 56 31 34 0.4 2.9
USA 9197 109911 04 50 80 85 221 137 0.8 147
SOURCE- Derived from information in the Brewers Association of Canada InternatIonal Survey Alcoholic Beverage Taxation and Control Policies.
1 HL 100 liters 26 4 gallons
Denmark s beer Imports were generally small and declining throughout the period However a few relatively large Increa e in import in later years aused imports ac a
percent of consumption and imports per capita to grow ataverage annual rates of 218 and 2,146 4 respectively
Average annual rate of growth for 1978 1986of the difference between exports and imports
divided by the sum of exports and imports.~If
the index is close to zero, the degree of intra-
industry trade is substantial. An index value of
one indicates that there is no intra-industry
trade. This index, labeled the “Intra-Industry
Trade Index” and shown in table 1, was calcu-
lated for beer trade in 1975 and 1987.
Of the 23 countries for which the index could
be calculated for both years, nine countries’ in-
dexes rose over the period, indicating less intra-
industry beer trade. In 12 countries, the indexes
declined, indicating that intra-industry beer trade
had increased. Only five countries in table I had
an intra-industry index value of less than 0.5 in
1987. The majority (70 percent) had an index
value of more than 0.5 in 1987, which indicates
that intra-industry trade plays a minor role in
the brewing industry in general, although it has
become more prevalent during the past 15 years.
The growth rates of IPC and EPP provide fur-
ther evidence of the increasing importance of
intra-industry trade to the brewing industry. Of
the 20 countries in table I reporting increased
EPP between 1975 and 1987, 16 also reported
increased IPC. Similarly, of the 19 countries
reporting increased IPC, 16 reported increased
EPP, In sum, merchandise trade in beer has ex-
panded rapidly during the past 25 years, with
intra-industry trade playing a small, but growing,
role in beer trade.
.Licensing •/ih’rt~~111e1sts
Brewers also use licensing agreements to make
their products available to foreign consumers. A
typical license agreement allows a brewer in
one country to brew and market the beer of a
foreign brewer. One example is Anheuser-
Busch’s (A-B) licensing agreement with the Cana-
dian brewery John Labatt Ltd. This agreement
allows Labatt to brew and market some A-B
beers, such as Budweiser and Michelob, in Cana-
da. In return, Labatt pays a royalty fee to A-B.
Of course, the licensing brewers insist that the
consistent quality of their products be main-
tained. In essence, the licenser is selling its
know-how in brewing a specific beer, the right
to use a trademark and the name recognition it
has buih for that trademark in exchange for a
royalty payment from the licensee. There were
at least 30 licensing agreements among various
brewers around the world in 1987 (see table 2).
Several factors that are not mutually exclusive
promote the use of licensing agreements. First,
some firms use licensing agreements to circum-
vent trade barriers. For example, U.S. beers
that are brewed in Canada under license agree-
ment are not subject to either the Canadian
federal tariff or the discriminatory mark-ups
that other imported beers face at the provincial
government outlets.~Second, the physical quali-
ties of beer promote the use of licensing agree-
ments. Beer is about 90 percent water, so trans-
portation costs can be reduced through local
production. In addition, beer has a shelf-life of
about three to four months, of which two to
three weeks could be taken up by overseas
shipment. Also, when companies enter new
markets, they often find it more profitable to
license existing plants and distribution systems
to handle their products rather than build their
own plants and establish their own distribution
systems.
The import and export figures discussed previ-
ously did not include consumption of foreign-
held brand names that are brewed domestically
under a licensing agreement. Thus, the degree
of internationalization is understated when only
merchandise trade is analyzed. Information on
the amount of beer brewed under licensing
agreements is usually closely held by the com-
panies involved, and not much data are publicly
available. The Conference Board of Canada,
however, has estimated the impact of licensed
brewed beer in the Canadian beer market and
its findings serve to demonstrate how important
licensed production can be.
In the Canadian market, three U.S. brewers,
Anheuser-Busch, Coors and Miller, had licensing
agreements with the three largest Canadian
brewers— John Labatt, Molson and Carling
O’Keefe— respectively, in 1986.G The Conference
4See Gray (1987), pp. 243-49.
5The U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement eliminates the
federal tariffs on beer between these countries, but does
not alter the pricing practices of the provincial liquor
outlets. See Carter, et al (1989) for a more detailed
description of Canadian barriers to beer trade.
6
Molson and Caning O’Keefe agreed to merge their
breweries in 1989. The new company is called Molson






,Board estimates that brands produced in Canada
under license with U.S. brewers in 1986 may
have accounted for as much as 15 percent of
beer sales in Canada.’ This amounts to approx-
imately 2.7 million barrels of U.S. brands pro-
duced and sold under license agreements in
Canada in 1986. If these estimates are correct)
the volume of licensed production of U.S. beers
in Canada was more than 17 times the amount
of beer exported directly to Canada in 1986 and
more than four times the amount of total U.S.
beer exports to all countries (exclusive of ship-
ments to U.S. military bases and Puerto Rico).8
In terms of Canadian consumption, the licensed
brewed beer might have accounted for 15 per-
cent of Canadian beer consumption compared
with the 2.1 percent of domestic consumption
accounted for by imports.
The numerous licensing agreements with
breweries in Japan and the United Kingdom
might indicate that beer produced under license
represents a significant part of the foreign beer
consumed in these countries. At least in some
countries, beer produced under license clearly
accounts for a much larger portion of foreign
beer consumption than does imported beer.
.Fo.reiqn IJirect .Invesftnent
In addition to merchandise trade and licensing
agreements, the internationalization of the brew-
ing industry has been characterized by the in-
creasing production of beer by foreign-owned”
firms. This production reflects the increasing
frequency of foreign direct investment (FDI), in
which one brewer purchases an existing firm or
invests in a new or existing facility in a foreign
country. Like licensing agreements, FDI is a
substitute for merchandise trade. Firms may be
prompted to use FDI for the same reasons they
use licensing agreements. In addition) such fac-
tors as lower labor and energy costs and less
government regulation may also encourage the
use of FDI.
Several brewers have invested capital in
breweries outside their home countries. Two
Australian brewers, Elders IXL and Bond) have
used this method of globalization extensively.
Elders purchased Courage Ltd. of England in
1986, then purchased Carling O’Keefe breweries
of Canada in 1987, Early in 1989, Britain’s De-
partment of Trade and Industry blocked the
proposed takeover of Scottish & Newcastle
Breweries PLC by Elders IXLLtd.°In 1990, Elders
IXL announced that its United Kingdom Courage
breweries would purchase Grand I\.etropolitan’s
U.K. brewing and brands interests and its beer
distribution and wholesaling activities. Further-
more, Courage’s 4,900 pubs will merge with
Grand Met’s 3,570 pubs in a joint venture under
the name Inntrepreneur Estates.1°Bond has
purchased two U.S. breweries, Pittsburgh Brew-
ing and G. Heileman.
Japanese brewers also have actively invested
in foreign brewery operations. In 1989, Tat-
suuma-Honke Brewing Co. announced plans to
build a sake brewery on the grounds of the
Coors brewery in Colorado. In 1990, Asahi
Breweries Ltd. announced plans to invest $70
million to open a brewery near Denver, Colorado,
where it will produce a dry beer.” Finally, the
Canadian brewing company John Labatt Ltd.
purchased Latrobe Brewing Co. of the United
States in 1987.
THE ECONOMICS OF •INTFHNC
TIONALIZATION
Underlying the preceding description of the
internationalization of the brewing industry at-c
some economic factors. The next section outlines
the reasons why demand for foreign beer can
exist in a country that already produces some
domestic brands and discusses how changing
relative prices and rising income can expand
the demand for foreign beer. ‘I’he second sec-
tion analyzes the basic economic factors that
determine the type of international transaction
a brewery will use to put its products in the
hands of foreign consumers. A more technical
presentation of the economics discussed in these
two sections is provided in appendixes to this
article.
‘Conference Board of Canada (1989), p. 9.
°Datafor U.S. beer exports to Canada and total U.S. beer
exports, exclusive of shipments to military bases, Puerto
Rico and the territories, were provided courtesy of R.S.
Weinberg & Associates.
°Carrington(1989).
“See Thornhill and Harris (1990), Harris (1990) and
Sherwell (1990).
““Japan’s Asahi Plans Brewery in U.S.” (1990).
,,,,c,,,,,n,)r ~~ flr C,t fl~Foreign Demand: Abe Attributes the low-calorie beer the rest of the time.
.Appruaeb
P~ ije,nnnd for .t’ore& a Eser tTan Exist
One reason why people consume foreign beer is
that they can buy it at a price at which they
want more beer than domestic brewers want to
produce. That is, the quantity of beer demand-
ed is larger than the quantity of beer supplied
domestically at the price of foreign beer) and
therefore, some foreign beer is imported to
meet the excess demand. Another reason why
people consume foreign beer is that at least
some consumers prefer the attributes, or char-
acteristics, of the foreign beer over domestic
brands. This second possibility is discussed in
this section.
In general, consumers purchase beer for the
services” that the~’feel it can provide.” Con-
sumet’s have a wide variety of beer brands to
choose from and, subject to pr’ice and income
limitations, will choose those brands that have
the attributes that most closely niatch their de-
sired services from drinking beer. Many attri~
butes, such as taste, caloric content, alcohol
content and packaging, distinguish one brand
from another, and each combination of charac-
teristics offers a distinctl different package of
services.
Brewers differentiate their products on the
basis of attributes and price. Consumers com-
pare the package of services provided by a par-
ticular beer and its price to the services and
prices of other brands. If consumers prefer the
services of foreign beer over domestic beer, at
given market prices, then demand for foreign
beer will exist in a country.
Of course consumers do not necessarily con-
sume only one domestic beer or foreign beer.
Consumet- satisfaction may be maxinuzed by
purchasing a combination of domestic and for-
eign beers. Suppose a consumer prefers the
taste of a high-calorie foreign beer over all other
domestic brands, but needs to watch his caloric
intake and finds the taste of a particular brand
of light beer to be acceptable. This consumer
might purchase both the foreign and domestic
beers, drinking the foreign beer in limited
amounts, say, on special occasions, and drinking
(;.,~ffi in the ,tJsn,nnit tSr 1’orsinEssr-~
The demand of foreign beer can expand if its
price falls relative to the price of domestic beer.
If a consumer had been purchasing domestic
beer, the relative fall in the price of the foreign
beer may be enough to compensate him for any
perceived loss in services due to switching from
the domestic to the foreign brand. In this case,
the quantity demanded of the foreign beer will
increase. The decline in the relative price of the
foreign beer may also encourage people who
already consume it to purchase more. Unfor-
tunately, data on imported beer prices are
scarce, and thus the role that changing relative
foreign beer prices has played in the globaliza-
tion of the industry is uncertain.
Increases in consumer incomes can also spur
the demand for foreign products. When con-
sumers’ incomes increase, they are able to pur-
chase more of all of the products they desire. In
general, however, the quantities purchased of
some goods, like flour, decline as incomes rise,
while quantities of other goods purchased, like
furniture, increase as incomes rise. The statistical
evidence relating beer consumption to income
growth is mixed.” Some studies have shown
that the quantity of beer consumed increases as
income increases, while others have shown the
opposite.
Although little work has been done to estimate
the relationship between foreign beer consump-
tion and income in general, there is some data
to suggest that the demand for foreign beer
might be positively influenced by increases in
income. All 21 OECD countries in table 1 that
provided import data on beer had positive per
capita gross domestic product growth between
1975 and 1986; 16 of these reported a positive
average annual rate of growth of beer imports
per capita and imports as a percent of consump-
tion. In addition, the maiket for imported beers
grew much more rapidly than most domestic
beer markets during the late 1970s and early
1980s, a period of income growth for most
countries. These figures roughly suggest that
per capita income growth has contributed to
the internationalization of the brewing industry.
“Much of the information in this section on the attributes
model is taken from Douglas (1987).
“For a review of beer demand estimates, see Ornstein
(1980). Also see Heien and Pompelli (1988). The estimated
income elasticity of beer in these studies ranged from
-0.46 to 0.79.
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Once a firm determines that foreign demand
for its products exists, it must determine the
lowest-cost method of supplying these products
to the foreign market. Should the firm use direct
exports, a licensing agreement or direct foreign
investment to enter the target market? The
answer is relatively simple, in theory, and is
based on the principle of profit maximization.
A brewery’s total cost of supplying a foreign
market is equal to the beer’s cost of production
plus transportation and distribution costs, mar-
keting costs and overhead. A brewery’s cost of
producing beer is a function of its production
technology and the cost of its inputs, such as
labor, agricultural ingredients and packaging
materials. Research has shown that the average
cost of producing beer declines as production
expands.” That is, economies of scale exist in
the brewing industry. Economies of scale en-
courage direct exporting when the quantity
demanded of foreign beer is relatively small and
encourage foreign production either through
licensing or foreign direct investment when the
quantity demanded is relatively large.
Suppose a U.S. brewer and a Japanese brewer
have identical production functions exhibiting
economies of scale and that the firms pay the
same price for their inputs. That is, their average
cost of production curves are equal and are
shaped as shown in figure 2. (For simplicity,
assume that the U.S-Japan exchange rate is fixed
throughout and, given this exchange rate, Japa-
nese prices are stated in U.S. dollars.) As the
brewers expand production, the average cost of
producing a unit of the product falls up to a
point, after which average costs no longer de-
cline but stabilize. Assume that Japanese de-
mand exists for a beer—called Colony—produced
by the U.S. firm. The U.S. firm must determine
whether it can supply the Japanese market
cheaper by producing Colony domestically and
exporting or by producing it in Japan, either
under license or by FDI.
Now suppose that supply and demand condi-
tions and price in the U.S. are such that
American consumers consume Q,,, units of Col-
ony, as shown in figure 2. (Note that the supply
and demand curves are not shown in figure 2
and the quantity Qm is simply given.) This sub-
stantial amount of consumption allows the U.S.
firm to achieve significant economies of scale,
producing Q0~ units of Colony at an average
cost of C, per unit. Also assume that market
conditions are such that a relatively small quan-
tity of Colony, Q,, , is demanded in Japan. Since
the U.S. brewer is already producing some Col-
ony for domestic consumption, expanding pro-
duction to meet the extra demand of Colony in
Japan would allow the U.S. brewer to move
down its average cost-of-production curve from
point A to point B, where it could produce Col-
ony for C.”
The alternative to producing the beer in the
United States and exporting it is to produce Col-
ony in Japan. Since Colony is currently not be-
ing produced in Japan, the Japanese firm or
branch brewery built by the U.S. firm would
have to brew the relatively small amount of Col-
ony, Q,, , at a high average cost of production,
C,. In other %vords, the relatively small quantity
of production will not allow the Japanese plants
to achieve significant economies of scale. Thus,
producing Colony in the United States for ex-
port would save the brewer C, —C, per unit of
Colony. If the cost of transporting Colony to
Japan and distributing Colony in Japan is less
than the difference between C, and C,, then the
U.S. brewer would maximize pt’ofits by exporting
Colony to Japan. If the quantity demanded of
Colony in Japan were larger, it might be more
profitable for the brewer to use a licensing
agreement or foreign direct investment.
Suppose that the quantity of Colony sold in
Japan grows to Q,2 as shown in figure 3, while
sales of Colony in the United States remain at
Q~- Since the U.S. brewer has exhausted its
economies of scale, it cannot produce Q0~+Q,,
at a lower per unit cost than that for Q0~+Q,1.
The Japanese brewery, however, by increasing
production from Q,, to Q,, could now match
the U.S. brewer’s cost of production because it
has also achieved the lowest possible average
cost of production. Thus, given equal average
‘4Elzinga (1973), Fuss and Gupta (1981), Keithman (1978)
and Scherer (1973) all provide evidence that economies of
scale exist in the brewing industry. See Thompson (1985)
or any micro-economic text for a discussion of the reasons
why economies or diseconomies of scale can exist at the
plant level.
“For simplicity, we have ignored any quantity response,
stemming from lower prices, that might occur in the U.S.
market as a result of the expanded output.Figure 2
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QJ1 QUS Otis +Oji 0J2 QUS + 0J2production costs, the U.S. firm will now prefer
to either negotiate a licensing agreement with
the Japanese brewer or use FDI, thereby saving
the additional export-related expenses of ship-
ping Colony overseas and distributing it within
Japan.
Like transportation costs, trade barriers also
offset production cost advantages. If a target
country has high tariffs or distribution systems
for imported goods that are relatively costly,
production cost advantages in the home country
may be offset and licensing and foreign direct
investment become the only feasible methods of
entering the target market. As shown below,
trade barriers have had a significant effect on
the choice of licensing agreements and foreign
direct investment in the internationalization of
the brewing industry.
In Japan, two types of barriers inhibit foreign
beer from entering the country. The most
significant of these is the Japanese distribution
system. The Japanese have a complex multi-
tiered system, comparable to the U.S. beer
distribution system, in which beer moves from
producer to wholesaler to consumer.’6 In addi-
tion, Japan has little warehouse space, which
means shipments are smaller and more frequent
than in the United States. Both aspects of the
Japanese distribution system raise the cost of
distributing beer in Japan, relative to less com-
plex systems. Japan also charges a small customs
duty on imported beer. These factors raise the
cost of exporting beer to Japan and make licens-
ing agreements or foreign direct investment
relatively more attractive methods of selling
beer in Japan.
A GATT panel ruled in 1988 that specific
practices of the Canadian provincial govern-
ments discriminated against imported beer.”
Canadian trade barriers include discriminatory
mark-ups at provincial liquor outlets and dif-
ferent marketing techniques for foreign beer,
such as smaller packages and warm foreign
beer sales at the governmental outlets. These
non-tariff barriers have prompted U.S. brewers
to use licensing agreements in Canada even
though several brewers have U.S. plants that
are located quite close to the Canadian border.
The Australian brewer Elders IXL has chosen to
use foreign direct investment to enter the Cana-
dian market. This creates an interesting situa-
tion in which a U.S. beer is being made under
license in a Canadian brewery that is partially
owned by an Australian brewer.
As in Japan, distribution practices are the
main barriers to trade in the United Kingdom.
Most beer consumed in the United Kingdom is
draft beer, and most of this is sold in pubs.
Many pubs are owned outright by breweries,
managed by the breweries or leased to in-
dividuals who enter into exclusive supply agree-
ments with the breweries. This system was the
subject of eight investigations between 1966 and
1986, that focused chiefly on pricing and supply
competition.’~Given the relationship between
the pubs and the domestic breweries, foreign
label brewers have problems getting local
brewers to carry their products in British pubs.
Thus, many foreign brewers have chosen to use
licensing agreements with domestic firms to
penetrate the U.K. beer market. Foreign direct
investment has also been used to enter this
market.
The brewing industry has evolved from an in-
dustry that concentrated on domestic markets
to one that views itself as part of a global mar-
ket. This internationalization has occurred via
the use of merchandise trade, licensing agree-
ments and foreign direct investment. Merchan-
dise trade in beer has developed in an intra-
industry pattern, whereas international transac-
tions in licensing agreements and foreign direct
investment have not developed, in general, in a
bilateral pattern. Licensed production and pro-
duction at foreign-owned breweries likely ac-
count for an unknown, but probably large, part
of foreign beer consumption in some countries.
“See VandeWater and Curiey (1990).
“G. Heileman Brewing Co. filed a Section 301 trade action
against Canada over unfair pricing and distribution prac-
tices of provincial governments. See Daily Report for Ex-
ecutives (1990).
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The attributes model, introduced by Lancaster
(1966, 1971), can he used to show how demand
for foreign beer can exist in a country in which
domestic brands are already produced.’ Suppose
a consumer chooses between two brands of
beer so that, subject to income limitations, his
satisfaction from the services provided by the
beer is maximized. For simplicity, assume the
consumer values only two attributes of beer:
taste and low calories. The two types of beer
provide these attributes in differing proportions
and at different prices.
After’ sampling both products, the consumer
rates each brand on a scale of I to 3, 3 being
best, for both taste and calorie content, as shown
in table Al. Brand F is a foreign beer that tastes
great, but is high in calories (thus receiving a
low rating on caloric content) giving it a rela-
tively high ratio of taste-to-calorie appeal. Brand
D, a domestic beer, does not taste quite as
good, hut is very low in calories. This beer then
has a relatively low taste-to-calorie appeal ratio.
Table Al
Attribute Ratings and Prices of Three
Beers
Ratio of
Attribute Rating taste to Bar price Bottles
Brand Calories Taste calories perbottle per $12
D 3 t 113 6
F 1 33 53 4
‘l’he amount of each beer the consumer can
purchase is determined by his income and
the price of the products. Assume that the
consumer has decided to spend 512 on beer
during a visit to a local bar and the cost of
each kind of beer is as shown in table Al - If
he spends the entire $12 on only one pro-
duct, he could buy at most six bottles of D or
four bottles of F. Four bottles of F would
provide 4 units (4 bottles X I unit of caloric
Figure Al
Maximization of Utility by Consuming
Only Domestic Beer
Taste
appeal per bottle) of the caloric attribute and
units (4 X 3) of the taste attribute.
The two products are depicted in figure Al in
an attribute space as rays from the origin. The
slope of each ray is determined by the ratio of
taste to calorie appeal. If the consumer drinks
hr-and F, then he moves out along ray F, absorb-
ing the two attributes in a ratio of 3:1. Points A
and B represent the maximum amount of the
two attributes that can he obtained by consum-
ing beers F and D, respectively, given the ~spend-
ing constraint of $12.
Joining points A and B provides the consumer’s
efficiency frontier. The efficiency fr-ontier is the
outer boundary of the attainable combination of
the two attributes, given the budget constraint
of $12. It is called efficient because a utility-
maxinizing consumer will get more utility by
being on the frontier rather than within the
frontier, even though these interior points are
attainable.
1Much of the information in this appendix follows the
discussion of the attributes model as presented by








Maximization of Utility by Consuming
Both Domestic and Foreign Beer
Flow do we know which beer, or combination
of beers, the consumer will choose? In the at-
tributes model, consumer’ preferences between
attributes can be expressed using indifference
curves. Like indifference curves used to express
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between
two products, the attribute indifference curves
express the MRS between attributes, and higher
indifference curves represent higher levels of
utility. The beer consumer’s assumed attribute
indifference curves I, and 11 have been superim-
posed on the attribute space in figure Al. As-
suming that a consumer wishes to maximize his
satisfaction from taste and caloric content, he
would choose to be on the highest attainable in-
difference curve, which occurs at point B in
figur-e Al.
The position and slope of the indifference
curves will determine the brand or brands of
beer chosen. This particular consumer has an
indifference curve that is relatively steep indi-
cating that, compared with a consumer with a
flat indifference curve, he is willing to give up a
lot of taste to get a few less calories.
Now suppose that a different consumer, who
gives the beers the same attribute ratings, is
willing to consume a lot more calor’ies to gain a
bit better taste. The shape of this consumer’s in-
difference curve would be more flat, and as
shown in figure AZ, this person would choose
the foreign brand F, at point A. Thus, in a socie-
ty where some consumers prefer the attributes
of foreign beers over domestic beers, a demand
for foreign beer will exist.
Figure A3 shows an example of a consumer’
who would purchase both foreign and some
domestic beer. Neither of the beers provides the
attributes exactly in the ratio represented by
point N. The consumer could reach this point,
however, by consuming some of both products.
By consuming L units of the domestic brand,
the consumer would obtain Y, units of taste and
X, units of caloric appeal. By spending the rest
of his budget on brand F, the consumer would
travel along the path LN, which has the same
slope as ray F, to obtain the X,—X units of calo-
rie appeal and the Y2—Y units of taste needed
to reach his maximum level of utility at point N.
Alternatively, the consumer could have started
by consuming M units of brand F and then con-
sumed L units of brand 13 to reach point N.
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The demand for foreign beer can increase if
the relative price of the foreign beer falls. As
shown in figure A4, when the price of the for-
eign beer falls, the maximum amount of the






Figure A4 Figure A5
The Price Effect Shown by the Attribute
Approach
Taste
The Income Effect Shown by the Attribute
Approach
shifting out the efficiency frontier from AB to
BC. In this example, the consumer goes from
buying some of both brands at point X to only
buying the foreign brand at point C.
Expanding incomes can also explain increased
consumer demand for foreign beer. In figure
AS, the consumer’s increase in income has led
to a shift from buying only the domestic beer to
buying some of both beers. Initially the con-
sumer’s efficiency frontier is AB, the highest in-
difference curve attainable is I, and the con-
sumer purchases only the domestic product 13.
When the consumer’s income increases, the effi-
ciency frontier shifts out in a parallel fashion to
A’B’, because prices and attributes are fixed and
only income is changing. For the given prices
and attributes, the increased income allows more
consumption of each beer. To maximize utility,
the consumer shifts to point C on the higher in-
difference curve I,, where he consumes some of
both brands of beer. Thus, a higher level of in-
come has induced the consumer to purchase
more of the foreign brand of beer.
Of course, the example could have been con-
structed to show how a shift in the consumer’s
income could have led to a reduction in the
amount of foreign beer purchased. Several re-
searchers have estimated the demand for beer,
but no conclusive evidence has been provided
as to whether beer consumption expands as a
consumer’s income expands. Some data, as dis-
cussed in the text, however, suggest that the de-
mand for foreign beer might be positively in-
fluenced by increases in income.
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Suppose that a U.S. brewer wants to sell its
beer, Colony) in Japan. The U.S. brewer has
three methods of supplying Japan with Colony:
I) produce Colony domestically and export to
Japan, 2) negotiate a licensing agreement with a
Japanese brewer who would brew and distribute
Colony in Japan, or 3) produce Colony in Japan
either by purchasing an existing Japanese brew-
ery or building a new brewery. Which is the
cheapest?
Assume that the long-run average cost (LBAC)
curves of any plants where Colony could be
brewed are identical. These potential plants in-
clude the U.S. parent firm and any branch plant
it may establish in Japan, as well as any existing
brewery in Japan that could brew Colony under
license. In addition, assume that the U.S--Japan
exchange rate is fixed throughout and, given
this exchange rate, Japanese prices are stated in
U.S. dollars.
Consider the level of demand for Colony in
the two countries. In the United States, as shown
in figure BI, part of the demand curve is above
the LRAC cur’ve, indicating that consumers are
willing to pay a price for Colony that is above
the U.S. firm’s average cost for some levels of
production. In Japan, however, if the demand
for Colony is relatively small, say 13, as shown
in figure B2, then Colony cannot be brewed
profitably there. At each quantity along 13 ,,, the
price consumers are willing to pay is below the
Japanese plant’s average cost of producing Col-
ony. Thus, when demand is 13 ~, direct exports
from the U.S. brewery will be the only way the
Japanese market might be supplied with Colony.
However, if the Japanese demand schedule for
Colony were much larger, say, at 13,,, then the
Japanese brewery could at least cover its pro-
duction costs for some level of production.
Thus, at this larger level of demand, both pro-
duction in the United States and in Japan are
potential routes of supplying Japan with Colony.
Consider the cost of producing different levels
of Colony for foreign consumption more closely.
Figure B2
Japanese Production Costs and Two
Demand Curves for Beer
Price Japan
Figure 81
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The goal is to determine which type of interna-
tional transaction allows the firm to provide
Colony to the Japanese market at the lowest
cost. First, consider the U.S. brewer’s cost of
producing and exporting Colony to Japan. As-
sume for a given market price, the quantity of
Colony demanded in the United States is Q~, as
shown in figure B3. The U.S. brewer produces
this amount at an average cost of C, per unit.
Now suppose that for a given price, the quan-
tity demanded of Colony in Japan is Q,,, as
shown in Figures B3 and B4. Since the U.S.
brewer already produces some Colony for do-
mestic consumption, by expanding production
to Q~+Q,to meet the export demand, the U.S.
brewery could move down its LRAC curve from
point A to B in figure B3, lowering its average
cost of producing Colony from C, to C,.’ If the
quantity demanded of Colony in Japan was
larger, at Q,,, the U.S. brewery’s average cost
of pr’oducing it would fall even further to C, at
point C. By doing a similar analysis for other
quantities of U.S. exports, we can develop the
QJ2
Figure B4
Japanese Plant’s Production Costs
Compared to U.S. Plant’s Cost of
Exporting
Figure B4 allows a straightforward com-
parison of the production costs of exports to
Japan, LRAC~,5,with the production of these
quantities in Japan, LRAC,. It shows that the
average cost faced by the U.S. brewer produc-
ing a given amount of Colony for export is lower
than the Japanese br’ewer’s average cost, LRAC,,
up to the quantity Q,,, but higher for all subse-
quent levels. This is possible, even when cost
cur’ves are identical across countries, because
the U.S. plant was already producing Colony for
domestic consumption and that by expanding
production to meet export demand, the average
cost of producing Colony fell. The Japanese
plant curr’ently is not producing any Colony; if
it were to start brewing Colony for Japanese
consumption, it would have to start at a higher
cost on its long-run average cost curve.
Economies of scale, however, do not continue
indefinitely. Consequently, the cost of producing
‘For simplicity, the analysis ignores any potential sales
price decline in the United States that may stem from the
brewer achieving greater economies of scale. Thus, the
quantity demanded in the United States, after production
is increased to meet export demand, is assumed to remain






U.S. brewer’s cost of producing different
amounts of Colony for expor’t to Japan, shown
by the line LRAC~~ in figure 84.Colony eventually starts to rise and the Japanese
plant can produce Colony cheaper than the U.S.
plant after point Q,,.
Thus far, the discussion has focused solely on
the cost of producing Colony. Transportation
and distribution costs are likely to influence
where production is located. Assume that it
costs the same per unit to ship and distribute a
small amount of Colony as it does a large amount
of Colony. Since the U.S. plant has to ship Colony
overseas, it is reasonable to assume that its
transportation and distribution costs will be sig-
nificantly higher than a Japanese plant’s would
be if Colony were produced there. Adding these
average per unit transportation and distribution
costs to the plant’s respective long-run average
cost of production curves gives the two dashed
lines, LRAC~5+t~, and LRAC,+t,, shown in
figure B4. The U.S. plant can produce, transpor’t
and distribute Colony to the Japanese market at
a lower cost than the Japanese brewery can up
to the quantity Q. Notice that the additional
costs of transportation and distribution have
lowered the quantity at which the U.S. brewery
can compete from Q,, to Q’. At quantities
beyond Q’, the Japanese firm can produce and
distribute Colony for less than C,, giving it a
cost advantage over the U.S. brewer.’
Because of the cost advantage, for any given
quantity of Colony demanded in Japan up to Q,
the U.S. firm would prefer to produce Colony
domestically and export the product to Japan. If
the quantity of Colony demanded in Japan were
greater than Q’, the U.S. firni would either at-
tempt to negotiate a licensing agreement with
the Japanese brewer or purchase or build a
Japanese brewery for production of Colony.
Whether the U.S. brewer would choose to
license production or open a branch brewery in
Japan would depend on several factors. Horst-
mann and Markusen (1987) note that if the Ii-
censee and the plant to be built or purchased
are equally efficient, then the need to give the
licensee the incentive to maintain the reputation
of the licenser’s product will result in FDI
always dominating the use of licensing. They
also conclude, however, that if the licensee and
branch plant are not equally efficient—that is, if
their LRAC curves are not identical—then other
factor-s such as the size of the market, the ex-
istence of close substitutes in the target market
and the level of interest rates in the two coun-
tries will determine whether licensing agree-
ments or FDI will be used.
In addition to production and distribution costs,
brewers also face tariff and non-tar’iff trade bar-
riers, which raise the cost of supplying a coun-
try with beer. In terms of figure B4, it is con-
ceivable that the U.S. brewery could have an
average cost of production considerably below
br’eweries in Japan, but that trade barriers in
Japan are so high that licensing agreements or
foreign direct investment become the preferr’ed
method of supplying the foreign country at all
levels of demand. Here, the LRAC~~+t0, curve
can be used to incorpor’ate this idea. Let the t,,~
variable now stand for transportation and
distm’ibution as well as costs associated with
trade barriers, such as tariffs. The existence of
trade barr’iers simply shifts the U.S. brewer’s
export cost curve upward, pushing Q’ closer to
the origin.
Other realistic problems associated with inter-
national transactions have been ignored in this
example. Some of the other factors that would
affect how a firm supplies a foreign market in-
clude differences in production technology and
input costs, government restrictions on foreign
investment, costs of negotiating and monitoring
licensing agreements, exchange-rate movements
and the role other products being produced at
the breweries might have on the plant’s cost of
production.
20f course, the Japanese firm will eventually reach its
points of diseconomies of scale and its average cost of
production will rise above C,,
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